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We introduce an efﬁciency-wage mechanism into an innovation-driven
growth model. Due to informational problems, the labour market is seg-
mented andhomogeneous workers maybeemployed either inanon-competitive
intermediate sector or in a competitive research one. We analyse the im-
pact that variations in the monopoly power of the intermediate ﬁrms may
have on unemployment, wage inequality and growth. We ﬁnd that the lower
the product market competition in the intermediate sector, the higher the
research employment, the lower the intermediate sector employment, the
higher the aggregate growth rate. Growth and inequality are negatively cor-
related whereas growth and unemployment are positively correlated. The
last two results are obtained through numerical simulations.
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11 Introduction
Economic theory has long ago stressed the potential welfare beneﬁts of a higher
level of product market competition. According to Nicoletti et al. (2000), such
beneﬁts concern the labour market outcomes as well since more competition on
the product market is likely to augment output and labor demand, lower the bar-
gainedreal wageand reduce theimpactof shockson unemployment,thussmooth-
ing employment ﬂuctuations in downturns.
In a recent paper, Amable and Gatti (2000)propose a model of imperfect com-
petition ` a la Cournot with an endogenous determination of workers ﬂows in and
outofunemploymentandwithwages determinedaccordingtoanefﬁciency wages
mechanism. In their model imperfect competition is measured by the number of
Cournot-type ﬁrms. Unlike Nicoletti et al. (2000), they ﬁnd that increased prod-
uct market competition leads to a stronger turnover rate in the labour market as
a response to demand and/or productivity shocks and ultimately to a rise in both
the efﬁciency wage and the unemployment rate. However, in their model Amable
and Gatti (2000) do not offer any answer to the question of the possible impact
of more competition on aggregate economic growth. This is indeed an important
topic analysed only recently by the new growth theory.
The basic story emerging from the endogenous technological progress growth
literature is that proﬁt-seeking agents devote resources to produce a new (or a
higher quality) good. A successful innovation provides the proﬁt-seeker with a
monopolisticposition in the product market and therefore with monopolisticprof-
its for some period of time (quality ladder models) or forever (expanding varieties
models). From these approaches the prediction arises that monopoly power (more
accurately, the expectation of extracting monopoly proﬁts in the near future if one
successfully innovates) stimulates innovation and, then, growth.
As in the literature dealing with the relationship between product market com-
petition and the labour market, so too in the one dealing with the impact of mar-
ket power on aggregate growth, the main results seem to be ambiguous. Bucci
(1998), for instance, clearly shows that in a horizontal differentiation framework
the above-mentioned relationship can be either positive or negative depending on
the absolute dimension of the market power enjoyed by the successful innova-
tor, the type of technology currently in use in the production sectors and also the
intensity of competition between growth-generating activities (R&D) and non-
growth-generating ones (production) for the same scarce resource. Recent em-
pirical work (Blundell et al. 1995; Nickell 1996) suggest a positive correlation
between product market competition and ﬁrm/industry level productivity growth.
Aghion et al.(1997 [1], [2]) and Aghion and Howitt(1996, 1998 [7], [8]) reconcile
this evidence with the Schumpeterian growth paradigm considering three possi-
ble explanations respectively based on agency considerations, the tacit nature of
2knowledge and the decomposition of R&D activities into research and develop-
ment. Finally, Bucci (2001) shows that the market power-growth nexus continues
to stay ambiguous even in a context where human capital is allowed to grow over
time and R&D and skilled workers are complements.
Alltheseendogenousgrowthmodelssufferfromanimportantlimitation. They
assume, indeed, full employment in the labour market. Empirical evidence on Eu-
ropean labour markets does not conﬁrm this hypothesis. Even from a theoretical
perspective, labour economists have removed this assumption (Layard, Nickell,
Jackmann, 1991). In this respect, models with asymmetric information have pro-
posed many factors potentially able to explain the persistence of an unemploy-
ment rate above the frictional one, showing at the same time that labour market
segmentation may come out from informational problems. However, these anal-
yses, generally known as efﬁciency wage theories, are usually carried out in a
static framework and rarely consider the relationship between unemployment and
growth1.
The long run relationship between growth and unemployment is analysed by
Pissarides (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1994, 1998[7]) and Mortensen and Pis-
sarides (1998) within a labour market search model. In these papers two compet-
ing effects of growth on unemployment are at work. On the one hand, an increase
in growth raises the capitalised value of a ﬁrm and thus the incentive for ﬁrms
to create new jobs (this is the capitalization effect, Aghion and Howitt 1998[7]).
On the other hand, an increase in growth has a creative destruction effect when
it raises the separation rate and discourages the creation of new job vacancies.
Which of the two effects does prevail at the end is unclear a priori. In the Pis-
sarides model (1990), the capitalization effect prevails on the creative destruction
effect (growth and unemployment are negatively correlated) , whereas the con-
trary is true in Aghion and Howitt (1994)2. The same result of Aghion and Howitt
(1994) is also found by Eriksson (1997), where the interest rate is made endoge-
nous and derived from a Ramsey model with optimizing consumers.
A missing point in all the classes of models considered above is wage inequal-
ity. Empirical evidence strongly suggests that wages differ considerably across
broad sectors of the economy, among individuals with different observable traits
(such as education, experience, race and gender) and also within groups of homo-
geneous individuals (Gottshalk and Smeeding 1997). According to Bertola and
Ichino (1995), the institutional speciﬁcities of continental Europe (a high mini-
mumwage, centralized wagesetting and a very extensivesocial safety net)slowed
the rise of inequality in many countries (such as France, Germany and Italy), but
1Amongtheexceptions,notablyare: BeanandPissarides(1993)andthecommentofCaballero
(1993) to their paper; Aghion e Howitt (1994); Van Schaik and De Groot (1998).
2Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) explain in detail why these two models reach opposite con-
clusions, even though they belong to substantially the same class of models.
3this came at a very high price: the explosion of structural unemployment3.
The aim of this paper is to assess, within a uniﬁed and homogeneous frame-
work, the impact that tougher product market competition may have on unem-
ployment, wage inequality and growth. In order to do this we embed a dual
labour market ` a la Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)4 into an endogenous growth model
` a la Grossman and Helpman (1991). The hypothesis of a dual labour market al-
lows us to introduce formally inequality in wage rates between primary sector
workers (who are paid an higher efﬁciency wage) and secondary sector workers
(whose wage is the competitive one). In particular, we consider a labour market
in which workers are homogeneous with respect to their productivity and their
reservation wage. Segmentation of the work-force is then due to the coexistence
in this economy of two different sectors: the research sector, characterised by im-
perfect monitoring of workers effort level and the intermediate good sector, where
labour market is competitive. Thus, wage inequalities that emerge in equilibrium
do depend on job differences only. In comparison with the existing literature, we
maintain the hypothesis that segmentation and the intensity of workers turnover
on the labour market are exogeneous5.
In addition to research and intermediate inputs the economy produces, in a
separate sector, an homogeneous consumer good. In order to produce such output
a representative ﬁrm employs at time
t all the varieties of capital inputs exist-
ing at the same time. In the product markets, we assume perfect competition in
the markets for the ﬁnal good and research and monopolistic competition in the
market for specialised inputs. Under these hypotheses we ﬁnd that the lower the
product market competition in the intermediate sector, the higher the research em-
ployment, the lower the intermediate sector employment, the higher the aggregate
growth rate. We also show that when the turnover rate is low enough, then wage
inequality is negatively correlated with market power. Finally, from numerical
analysis, we get that market power and unemployment are positively correlated.
The paper is organised as follows: in the next section we present the economic
structure, described by a traditional endogenous growth model, based on the exis-
tence of a research sector whose aim is to discover new varieties of intermediate
goods; the third section proposes an analytical description of the labour market
outlined above. In the fourth we compute the growth rate and the wage inequality
3the hypothesisusually done to explain the higher rates of wage inequality in the US economy
and of unemploymentin continental Europe in the last few years is that of skill biased technologi-
cal change. Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994) and Krueger (1993) offer direct evidence on the
relationship between skill-biased technological change and changes in the wage structure.
4Modiﬁed in order to allow for segmentation as in Perrot and Zylberberg (1989), Fiorillo and
Staffolani (2000) and De Palma (2000).
5Cahuc and Zajdela (1991) on the one hand and Mendez (1999) and Gatti and Amable (2000)
on the other do endogenise respectively labour market segmentation and turnover ﬂows.
4index of the economy The ﬁfth section evaluates the relationships among product
market competition, growth, unemployment and wage inequality. Some conclud-
ing remarks are presented in section 6.
2 The Economy
The economic structure we have in mind is qualitatively similar to the one pro-
posed by the traditional ”Ideas-Based” growth models (Aghion and Howitt, 1992;
Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Chaps. 3 and 4; P.Romer, 1990). In particular, we
imagine an economy where three sectors of production are vertically integrated.
In the research sector, ﬁrms engage in innovation activity, using knowledge capi-
tal (
A)a n d
N workers, whose effort can be monitored with probability
q.W h e n
monitored, a worker is ﬁred if his effort is below a given level6. Innovation con-
sists in discovering new designs for ﬁrms operating in the capital goods sector.
The number of designs existing at a certain point in time coincides with the num-
ber of intermediates and represents the actual stock of non-rivalknowledgecapital
available in the economy. To enter the intermediate sector, a ﬁrm must acquire a
patent. Purchasing a patent means that the ﬁrm acquires not only the know-howto
manufacture a specialised intermediate, but also an inﬁnitely-lived monopolistic
position to market the same intermediate good. Unlike Romer (1990), and follow-
ing Grossman and Helpman (1991, Chap. 3), we assume that local intermediate
monopolists employ only workers
S which are effort is known without cost7 (i.e
not subject to monitoring activity) through a one-to-one technology8. Finally, in
the ﬁnal output sector ﬁrms produce a homogeneous good combining, at time
t,
all the varieties of intermediate inputs existing at the same time (
A
t).
2.1 The Final Good Sector.
































1, the CES-type technology in Eq. 1 exhibits decreasing returns
in the quantity of the i-th intermediate input employed at time
t. This hypothesis
6So these workers have to be paid with an efﬁciency wage to grant effort.
7So these workers can be paid at their reservation wage.
8Results do not change if we assume that both types of workers (those who are and those who
are not subject to monitoring) are employed in both sectors (intermediate goods and research).
This hypothesis has, however, the disadvantage of making the exposition a bit more complicated.
5allowsustodeﬁneexactlyboththeoptimallevelofinputsbeingused(thedifferent
varieties of capital goods) and, as will be clearer later on, the dimension of the
economic system under analysis.
A
t denotes the total number of capital goods
invented up to
t. In this sector atomistic producers engage in perfect competition.



















From the zero proﬁt condition10 it is possible to derive the (inverse) demand

















Under the speciﬁc assumption that each ﬁrm producing intermediate inputs is
so small that a marginal increase in the quantity it produces does not change the
quantities produced by its own market rivals, and then total intermediate output11,
from Eqs. 1 and 2 it follows that the demand for the i-th capital good exhibits




￿. This elasticity coincides with the elasticity of
substitution between two generic varieties of intermediates. As we will see in a
moment,
￿ also enters into the deﬁnition of the mark-up rate charged over the
marginal cost by the local intermediate monopolists.
2.2 The Intermediate Inputs Sector
Capital goods producers engage in monopolistic competition. Each ﬁrm produces
one (and only one) horizontally differentiated intermediate good and must pur-
chase a patented design before producing its own specialised capital good. Thus,
the price of the patent represents a ﬁxed entry cost. Following Grossman and
9From now on, in order to ease the notation, the index t near the variables depending on time
will be omitted, unless this may induce confusion.
10Since we are dealing with decreasing returns to scale in a competitive product market, the
price of the ﬁnal good will decrease as long as ﬁrms make a positive proﬁt. We suppose the
existence of a minimum technical size for ﬁrms, that will stop this process at a certain point in
time. Hence, the intersection between the increasing average cost curve and the minimum ﬁrm’s
size deﬁnes the price of the ﬁnal output. We set this price to one, since the ﬁnal output has been
chosen as numeraire.
11In other words, as common in this literature, we are assuming that in the intermediate sector








6Helpman (1991, Chap. 3), we assume that each intermediate (local) monopo-















The ﬁrm producing the i-th variety, after bearing the expenses related to the
purchase of the i-th idea, maximises at each point in time its own instantaneous
proﬁt function with respect to
x
i and subject to the demand constraint (2). The
solutionto this maximisationproblem givesthe optimal price thei-th intermediate
































Thus, the constant mark-up charged over the marginal cost by each intermedi-
ate (local) monopolist (
1
￿) turns out to be a function of the price elasticity of the
demand faced by the i-th capital good producer (and deﬁned just above). Since the




h intermediate input is equal for each
i, from Eq. 2 it
follows that each local monopolist will produce the same output (
x), accruing the
same proﬁt rate (


































i the total capital goods12 output, we
































￿ is a proxy of the mark-up rate charged over marginal cost by
intermediate ﬁrms13.
From thelast equation above, we can express
S as a functionof
￿ (the measure





12Recall that these are available at time
t in
A varieties.
13See Benassy, 1998 on this point.




































As is clear from Eq. 5, the demand for non-monitored workers (
S) depends
positively on the inverse of the mark-up term (
￿) and negatively on the wage rate
(
w



























Giventheintermediatesectormarket structure, such aproﬁtisto bedecreasing
with respect to the number of intermediate ﬁrms (
A). From Eq. 6, it is possible to
show that this is true whenever
￿
<
￿ . From now on we will assume that such a
condition is always checked.
2.3 The R&D Sector
There are many competitive ﬁrms undertaking R&D These ﬁrms produce designs
(or blueprints) indexed by





the total stock of society’s knowledge. Designs are patented and partially exclud-
able, but nonrival and indispensable for capital goods production. With access to
the stock of knowledge
A, in order to develop new blueprints, research ﬁrms use
monitored workers (
N). These workers are paid an efﬁciency wage
w
N . Follow-
ing P. Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991, Chap.3), the production










0is the productivity parameter of the research workers .
Since the sector is competitive, entry of new ﬁrms into the sector will happen
until the proﬁt possibilities will be completely exhausted. The static free entry









Eq. 8 simply represents the equilibrium condition prevailing in a perfect com-
petition market (namely the equality between price and marginal cost).
3 The labour market
As mentioned above, we suppose that labour relations in the research sector are
characterised by the existence of monitoring problems. On the contrary the inter-
mediate sector does not face this kind of problems. Thus workers in R&D sector
8receive wages higher than workers in intermediate one. Moreover the structure of
theeconomy, and the staticdecreasing returns to scale in theﬁnal good production
(eq. 1) imply that the employment
N
+
S can be lower than the labour force
L.
Then in this section we study the preferences of workers and the wage setting.
3.1 Preferences






N for the research workers;
i
=
S for the intermediate sector
workers) and deliver an effort
E, which is constant and equal for all workers.
We assume that workers devote all their wage to the purchase and the con-




























































































0denotes the subjective discount rate,
W is individual wealth (in real
terms) and
r the real interest rate. The solution to this dynamical problem is given







At this stage it is easy to show that in a steady-state equilibrium (when all
variables depending on time, wages included, grow at a constant rate), the ex-
pected intertemporal utility of the two classes of employed workers grow at the
same rate of their own real wage (and consequently at the same rate of their own
consumption and instantaneous utility)14.
3.2 Wages rates





















































































t. This follows immediately from the fact that in steady state
g is
constant. Finally, the condition
￿
>


















1the effort of a shirker worker and with
E
>
1 the effort of
a non shirker.
Usually, in efﬁciency wage models workers utility is separable and linear in
wage (
w) and effort (
E). The use of a separable utility function (
w
￿
E)i ng r o w t h
models could give rise to some problems when effort is considered constant15.
Using an asset pricing approach16 we ﬁrst compute worker expected intertem-
poral utility in both sectors.
The expected intertemporal utility of a non-shirker worker employed in the





) must be equal to the sum of three






, 2) the loss of utility in the case of ﬁring









b is the probability each worker may





























S is the expected intertemporal utility of a worker employed in the inter-
mediate sector.



























Unlike the previous case, since a worker may be monitored and ﬁred with
probability












































resent the higher utility he would obtain.





















































16As in the recent work of Mendez 1999.
10where
R is the reservation wage and
a
D is the probability to be hired in the re-







We assume that workers in the intermediate sector and unemployed people














Firms in the research sector avoid that their own workers behave as shirkers.
















N). Combining Eq. 11 and Eq. 12, the following


















As we will clarify later, the steady state equilibrium is such that: 1) employ-












) in both sectors grow
at the same rate
(
g
), that, in equilibrium, will be constant and equal to the total






































































Flows condition in the research sector requires that the number of ﬁred work-




















represents both the unemployment rate and the number of the unemployed peo-
ple. Solving the ﬂows condition above in
a, substituting the result in Eq. 15 and
dividing it by
w






































We can state now the following:
Proposition 1 The ratio between the wage rate of workers in the research sector
and the one of workers in the intermediate sector (relative wage) is an increasing
function of the employment in the research sector and a decreasing function of the
aggregate growth rate (
g).
Proposition 1 is proved differentiating Eq. 16 with respect to
N and
g.
Eq. 16 shows that relative wage depends on employment and the growth rate.
It is coherent with the traditional efﬁciency wage models as far as the relationship
between relative wages and unemployment is concerned. Instead, the relationship
between relative wage and growth rate needs further explanation.
In equilibrium wages in both sectors grow at the same rate and therefore their
absolute difference grows over time. This means that the ”value” of a job in the
primary sector with respect to the outside options is higher when growth rates
are higher. The higher the growth rate, more costly is to be ﬁred from a job
that pays an efﬁciency wage. Because of this, workers require a lower efﬁciency
premium. In other words, an economic system that grows faster presents less
incentive problems.
4 Endogenous Growth
We concentrate on an equilibrium characterised by the coexistence of both the
intermediate and research sectors. In other words, in the present paragraph we
compute the growth and wage inequality rates of the economy when employment
in the two above mentioned sectors (respectively
S and
N) is positive and the
growth rates of all the variables depending on time are constant (balanced growth
path). In what follows, we denote by
g
x the growth rate of variable
x. From Eq. 7,











0 ). In addition,
g
N will be positive when
N
>








0 ). This result stems




0, then the intermediate sector shrinks
over time and in the very long run(when
t
!
1) it disappears completely (
S





































































be equal to one. In such a case
G becomes a parameter not depending on
￿,s i n c e









































Taking logs and deriving with respect to time both sides of Eq. 19, the growth












In order to reach this result we have used Eq. 17. From Eqs. 19 and 20






S. In order to compute the growth rate of
w
N (the wage rate accruing to the research workers) we use an ”asset pricing
equation” approach. According to such approach, the price (or market value) of a

















be equal, in equilibrium, to the sum of two terms: 1)the instantaneous monopoly
proﬁt coming from the production of the i-th capital good (
￿); 2) the capital gain
or loss matured on
P






From Eq. 21, using the corresponding equations for
P
A (Eq. 8) and
￿ (Eq. 6)
and the fact that
r
=









































S). We can now state the following:
13Proposition 2 In the long run equilibrium, the output growth rate (
g
Y ) equals
















S. In addition, it is true that
!,
N and
S are all constant.
















Proposition 3 For a given employment level in the research sector (
N), Eq. 23
implies that the aggregate growth rate depends positively on: 1) the productivity
of the research workers (
￿); 2) the level of the returns to scale in the ﬁnal output
sector (
￿); 3) the monopoly power enjoyed by intermediate ﬁrms (
1
￿).
Obviously,the growthrate also depends on theemployment ofresearch sector.
In order to ﬁnd out the equilibrium value of

















S and making use of Eq. 23, after some simple algebraic manipulations we






















































For Eq. 24 to be economically meaningful, the term in brackets must be





















The steady state equilibrium is at the intersection of the wage setting function




































Since in Eq. 25 the growth rate
g has been endogenised, the wage setting















). When this condition holds, the





￿, the term outside the brackets is positive for sure. Recall that
￿
<
￿ makes the proﬁt function of a generic intermediate ﬁrm decreasing with respect to the
number of existing producers (
A).
14setting function is increasing in
N since the efﬁciency premium becomes higher







the wage setting function displays a vertical asymptote for values of
N strictly
lower than 1.
5 Market Power, Unemployment, Inequality and
Growth
In order to study the relationship between competition and growth within the
present framework, ﬁrst of all we should be particularly clear on what we mean
by (imperfect) competition and where the mark-up measure comes from. Indeed,
as already pointed out by Aghion and Howitt (1997, p. 284) and Benassy (1998),
the natural measure of the degree of competition is, in this class of models, the
parameter
￿ and not the number of ﬁrms operating in capital goods manufac-
turing. This is due to the hypotheses of Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) technology in the
downstream sector and the absence of any form of strategic interaction among
producers in the intermediate sector. In fact, the higher
￿, the higher the elastic-





means that they become more and more alike when
￿ grows and, accordingly, the





￿) tends to be inﬁnitely large when
￿ tends to one. In a word, the
”toughness” of competition in the intermediate sector is strictly and positively de-
pending on the level of
￿. Conversely, the inverse of
￿, can be viewed as a proxy
for how uncompetitive the sector is. Along these lines, a recent paper of Van De
Klundert and Smulders (1997), compares, within an endogenous growth model,
the ”toughness” of Bertrand versus Cournot competition explicitly taking into ac-
counttheperceivedprice-demandelasticity. Theyconcludethatinan oligopolistic
set-up: ”...price competition ` a la Bertrand is tougher than quantity competition ` a
la Cournot because the former results...in higher elasticity and lower proﬁt mar-
gins set by ﬁrms” (p.108). Sutton (1991) also points out that, for a given number
of incumbents in the market, the lower the markup coefﬁcient (in our case
1
￿ ),
the stronger the competition. Therefore, in what follows
1
￿ will represent the key
variable in measuring the level of mark-up and (imperfect) competition in the in-
termediate goods production.
5.1 Analytical results




f) (Eq. 25) and the labour demand curve (24) in the plane of the employ-
15Figure 1: Wage setting and R&D labour demand functions for different
￿ (dotted
lines are drawn for higher values of
￿)













ment level in the R&D sector,
N (x-axis) and the disparity index,
! (y-axis). The
dotted lines are the same curves for higher
￿.








f shifts upwards, whereas the vertical intercept does not change.
2. the labour demand function shifts to the left.
3. employment in R&D decreases.
Proof 4 The proof of the ﬁrst part of proposition 4 is easy. Deriving Eq. 25 with
respect to





















b for each mark-up size.





































































































































































￿. Moreover, to have positive values of
















































The last part of proposition 4 is a consequence of the ﬁrst two: if the labour
demand function moves left and the wage setting function up, then employment
must decrease.
On these bases, we may conclude that when market power in the intermediate
sector increases:
1. R&D employment increases (proposition 4);
2. the growth rate increases (Eq. 23);
3. employment in the intermediate sector decreases (Eq. 18);
4. total employment may increase or decrease depending on the result of job
creation in R&D and job destruction in the intermediate sector. It is not
possible to deﬁne analytically the sign of total employment change due to
an increase in market power;
5. wage inequality (























































￿ are negative. This means that the sign of the ﬁrst
term is positive. On the contrary, the second term is always negative. In
sum, it is not possible to determine the sign of the relation between inequal-
ity and market power. In any case, if
b is near to 0, then the wage inequality
is increasing with
￿ (it is negatively correlated to market power). Thus, for
low turnover values (
b) wage inequality is decreasing with market power
and growth .
17These are the main analytical conclusions concerning the relation between market
power and the main macro-variables of the model . To clarify the nature of these
relations and to derive further information, we propose some numerical simula-
tions.





! from numerical simula-
tions
In this section we use numerical simulations in order to obtain a more precise
information about the relationships among market power, unemployment rate and
wage inequality.










￿ )it isnot difﬁcult
to set a range for their plausible values. Furthermore, the simulations we propose
are built in such a way to obtain ”realistic” values for the unemployment rate, the
wage inequality and the growth rate.










1throughout all the simulations;




































0 is uniformly distributed between
0
and
1 (this condition implies that intermediate ﬁrms proﬁts are decreasing


































1 is uniformly distributed
between
0 and


















2 is uniformly distributed between
0 and
1, that is a necessary condition in order to have
S
<
1 (see Eq. 5 and the
deﬁnition of
G);
￿ we derive analytically
N
￿ from Eqs. 26 and 25;


















18Figure 2: Unemployment distribution-Wage inequality distribution
Unemployment rate








































1and discard all the others. We remain with 26037 valid cases.
Table
1 presents the minimum, maximum, average and standard deviation of
parameters coming from selected simulation:
Table 1: Parameters values
parameters minimum maximum average Std dev.
￿ 0.447 0.959 0.806 0.108
￿ 0.200 0.500 0.358 0.086
b 0.010 0.250 0.151 0.064
￿
q 0.356 1.300 0.885 0.236
Figure 2 presents the distributions of the unemployment rate and wage in-
equality obtained from the numerical simulations. The results show that the av-
erage is 9.7% for the unemployment rate and 1.2 for the wage inequality. The
simulated growth rate has an hyperbolic distribution whose average is 1.7%.
The next proposition summarises the main results obtained from our simula-
tions:
Proposition 5 An increaseinmarket power leadstoanincreaseinunemployment
in 93.6% of cases and to a reduction of wage inequality in 97.4% of cases.
19Figure 3: Unemployment rate with respect to market power
1.043 1.477
1.848 2.237
Unemployment increases (24363 cases)
Unemployment decreases (1674 cases)
Figures 3 and 4 plot the market power (on the horizontal axe) with respect to the
unemployment rate and wage inequality, respectively. Each point represents the
result of a simulation. The points (and the areas) colored in black represent the
cases where the previous proposition do not apply (respectively, 6.4% and 2.6%
of cases)19.
Hence we can conclude that:
Proposition 6 The lower product market competition, the higher the probability
that a further increase in the monopolistic power leads to a reduction in unem-
ployment and to an increase in the wage inequality.
Figure 3 shows clearly that, when market power is lower than a given level
(around 1.5) all simulations display an increase in unemployment when market
power increases further. The sign of the relationship reverses, but not in all cases,
19Recall that, for each simulation, taking as given all the other parameters, we have two results:
the ﬁrst refers to the value of the unemployment rate and wage inequality for a random
￿,a n d






". So, in each simulation, we
knowthe sign of the relationshipbetween variationsin the monopolypowerand the correspondent
variations in the other two variables mentioned above.
20Figure 4: Wage inequality with respect to market power
1.043 1.553
2.033 2.237
Inequality decreases (25570 cases)
Inequality increases (667 cases)
for higher
￿.O n l yi f
1
￿ is above 1.85 we obtain a decrease in unemployment when
market power increases.
Figure 4 shows that a positive relationship between market power and wage
inequality may exist only when the market power is higher than 1.55. Otherwise,
an increase in
1
￿ gives rise to a decrease in wage inequality.
The graphs reported in ﬁgure 5 show the dynamics of the variables of inter-
est with respect to ’realistic’ values of parameters. In particular, the ﬁrst graph
shows the wage inequality, the second the rate of growth, the third the sectorial
distribution of employment and the last the unemployment rate as a function of
1
￿. Generally speaking, most of our simulations conﬁrm the situation described in
ﬁgure 5: the higher the market power, the lower the wage disparity, the higher the
growth and unemployment rates. Employment in the R&D sector is increasing,
whereas it is decreasing in the intermediate sector.
21Figure 5: Model’s variables and market power
6 Concluding Remarks
In models dealing with unemployment, the presence of efﬁciency wages is a com-
mon hypothesis. In this paper we incorporate this hypothesis within an endoge-
nous growth model where R&D is the engine of growth. Our aim is to study
how product market competition in the intermediate sector impacts on the sec-
torial employment share, the unemployment rate, wage inequality and aggregate
growth.
As in several endogenous growth models (i.e. Bucci 1998), we ﬁnd that in-
creasing market power makes the growth rate increase as well. However, unlike
these models (displaying full employment), in our paper labour market is seg-
mented and unemployment arises due to the efﬁciency wage hypothesis. In this
respect we ﬁnd that a higher market power creates new jobs in the R&D sector
and destroys them in the intermediate inputs one. The overall effect is not pre-
dictable analytically, but looking at numerous numerical simulations carried out,
job destruction seems to prevail on job creation. In other words market power is
positively correlated with unemployment.
Due to the payment of efﬁciency wages in the research sector but not in the
22intermediate one, wage inequality is a natural result. The sign of the relationship
between wage inequality and growth can not be deﬁned analytically. However,
from numerical simulations it emerges that market power is negatively correlated
with wage inequality. For high values of market power the relation between mar-
ket power and unemployment/inequality may be reversed.
In sum, an higher growth rate, that depends positively on ﬁrms market power,
tends to destroy jobs and to reduce wage inequality. This result would conﬁrm
the main conclusion of Caballero and Hammour (1998) , according to which a
situation where growth and unemployment both increase is possible.
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